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A central challenge for natural resource management is developing rigorous yet practical approaches
for balancing the costs and beneﬁts of diverse human uses of ecosystems. Economic theory has a long
history of evaluating tradeoffs in returns from different assets to identify optimal investment strategies.
There has been recent progress applying this framework to the delivery of ecosystem services in land
use planning. However, despite growing national and international interest in marine spatial planning,
there is a lack of parallel frameworks in the marine realm. This paper reviews an ecosystem service
tradeoff analysis framework and provides a more comprehensive synthesis for how it can be applied to
marine spatial planning and marine ecosystem-based management. A tradeoff analysis approach can
reveal inferior management options, demonstrate the beneﬁts of comprehensive planning for multiple,
interacting services over managing single services, and identify ‘compatible’ services that provide win–
win management options.
.1. Introduction
Given the scope and magnitude of the environmental chal-
lenges facing natural resource management, there is an increasing
demand for more holistic, ecosystem-based approaches to man-
agement [1–4]. Ecosystem-based management (EBM) is a place-
based approach that aims to achieve the long-term ecosystem
health and functioning that in turn provide the ecosystem
services on which people rely [4–8]. Marine spatial planning
(MSP) is one type of planning process that offers a promising
opportunity for more integrated management and has been
gaining political momentum throughout the world [9,10]. MSP
identiﬁes which areas of the ocean are appropriate for different
uses or activities in order to reduce conﬂicts and achieve ecolo-
gical, economic and social objectives [11]. One central challenge
for translating EBM and MSP tenets from concept to practice iste and Bren School of Envir-
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b.edu (C. White),developing rigorous and straightforward approaches for balan-
cing diverse human uses of ecosystems [12]. This paper highlights
tools from economic theory and multi-objective decision making
for evaluating tradeoffs in the delivery of ecosystem services, with
particular emphasis on how such an approach could transform
ocean management.
Ecosystem services range from tangible to intangible (e.g., food
production versus aesthetic value) and provide natural capital
that is essential to human welfare [13]. The Millennium Ecosys-
tem Assessment [1] brought ecosystem service concepts to the
forefront, developing four widely used service categories: provi-
sioning (e.g., of seafood, timber), regulating (e.g., of climate,
ﬂoods, water quality), supporting (of other services, e.g., pollina-
tion for food production, nutrient cycling), and cultural (e.g.,
recreation, spiritual value). MSP attempts to allocate space to
the full range of services provided by the oceans, presenting a
signiﬁcant challenge to natural resource managers. Services fre-
quently are not independent of one another, but instead exhibit
complex interactions that generate tradeoffs in the delivery of one
service relative to the delivery of others [14–17]. In some cases,
two services may be mutually exclusive in space (e.g., wave
energy buoys may preclude commercial ﬁshing and vice versa),
while in other cases the tradeoff is less severe (e.g., ﬁshing and
recreational activities can often occur in the same locations, but
ﬁshing impacts might have a negative effect on some types of
recreation). Because not all interacting services can be maximized
simultaneously, society must make decisions about their relative
preferences for different services, and, consequently, how this
affects management decisions [15,18–20]. Managers make these
types of decisions on a regular basis, but often do so without the
explicit consideration of these tradeoffs [21].
Balancing the delivery of a range of services is particularly critical
for coastal and ocean ecosystems, which face growing human
populations, increasing associated impacts, and declining ecosystem
services [22–24]. Marine systems offer a challenging and interesting
opportunity for implementing MSP and speciﬁcally for examining
tradeoffs among services. For one, service valuation in marine
settings is complicated given the general absence of property rights
and the related fact that many key services are not traded in
markets (e.g., recreation, wildlife viewing, protection from shoreline
erosion). Furthermore, the primary market service from the oceans –
ﬁsheries – often lacks property rights, has inappropriate incentives
and frequently ineffective governance, and is managed using lim-
ited-quality stock assessments, which together promote unsustain-
able ﬁshing [25,26]. Management in the oceans also tends to be
fragmented, with limited governance or institutional frameworks for
spatial management and coordinated management across sectors
[27,28]. Lastly, marine systems host numerous emerging uses, such
as wave energy and offshore aquaculture. These emerging uses will
contribute to crowding among efforts to maximize the delivery of
particular services, posing an ideal prospect for more integrated
planning prior to their development. Such planning demands an
explicit analysis of tradeoffs among services under different man-
agement scenarios.
The economics discipline has developed a rich ‘‘production
theory’’ which concerns how ﬁrms optimally trade-off between
different inputs to production [29]. This is similar to portfolio theory,
which analyzes the tradeoff between variance (i.e., risk) and return
of a collection of assets, whether ﬁnancial stocks or ﬁsh stocks, so as
to maximize return for a given level of risk [30–32]. In parallel, there
is a long history within decision theory, including multi-criteria and
multi-objective analyses, of developing tools for decision-making
where there are numerous and often competing objectives [33].
Multi-criteria analysis has been applied to numerous marine appli-
cations [34–37] and there has been recent progress applying these
ideas to managing ecosystem services [20,38–41]. However, there is
not a synthesis of how tradeoff analysis can used in an EBM or MSP
approach. This paper (1) highlights one framework for analyzing
tradeoffs, including reviewing the types of tradeoffs possible in an
ecosystem services context and examining how this framework can
guide EBM and (2) provides demonstrations of how ecosystem
service tradeoff analysis can be applied to MSP using two stylized
examples based on data.2. Conceptual framework for ecosystem service tradeoff
analysis
Production theory, a branch of microeconomics that deals with
the production (as opposed to the consumption) side of the
economy, was developed to examine marketed commodities
[42]. While not a perfect parallel, this approach can also be
applied to the production of ecosystem services, marketed or
otherwise [43]. The guiding principle when applied to EBM is to
ensure the sustainable and efﬁcient delivery of multiple interact-
ing services. The challenge in meeting this goal is that providing
ecosystem services is ‘‘costly’’ in the sense that actions taken to
deliver one service may inhibit or divert scarce resources away
from actions that could have been taken to deliver other services.
For example, if one is using marine reserves to provide theecosystem service of biodiversity preservation, the possible pro-
vision of ﬁshery yield is reduced as a second service. The cost of
lost provisions from one service due to the use of another service
depends on the strength and nature of their interaction. Not all
services produce ‘costs’ to other services and this framework
allows one to identify ‘compatible’ services as well. In short, the
following analytical approach supports more informed manage-
ment decisions about real and perceived tradeoffs among ecosys-
tem services.
Production theory considers how different inputs produce dif-
ferent levels of outputs, typically expressed as production functions.
When applied to ecosystem services, production functions are
models that translate the structure and functioning of ecosystems
into the provision of ecosystem services [40,44,45]. A production
function approach has been used to value non-market ecosystem
services that can be considered as inputs into the production of
goods or services with market value (e.g., seagrass habitat as nursery
grounds is an input into ﬁsheries) [43,46], but also applies to
ecosystem services that are not readily connected to a marketed
output. Importantly, there may be many potential ecosystem service
outcomes that can arise from a given set of inputs. This provides a
basis for examining which outcomes are optimal in terms of
providing the combination of services that are important to society.
In cases with a small number of services or objectives, ecosys-
tem service outcomes can be analyzed graphically to evaluate
tradeoffs. In an EBM context, this involves some quantiﬁcation of
the ecosystem services produced across a broad range of potential
management actions or spatial plans (e.g., all possible MPA siting
options, all possible harvest regulations, etc.). This can be conducted
using empirical data, quantitative models or conceptual models,
depending on data and model availability, and ideally considers as
many sets of management actions as possible. In such an analysis,
the axes of the graph correspond with levels of ecosystem services
and each point corresponds with the outcomes from a given set of
management actions that are known or estimated to produce
amounts of each service. After plotting all (or a large subset of)
possible management options, the constraint envelope, or outer
bound of all the points, is the ‘‘efﬁciency frontier’’ comprised of
Pareto-efﬁcient options, whereby one service cannot be further
increased without a cost in terms of the other service (Box 1). This
‘‘ecosystem services’’ frontier depicts management options that
provide for the optimal delivery of the two or more services
[37,47,48]. Points interior to the frontier are suboptimal—at least
one service could be increased, at no cost to other services.
Although this approach may seem simplistic, it provides two
critical insights that can be used to guide EBM. First, the position
of a point relative to the frontier can suggest improvements to
current management practices. Regardless of the shape of the
frontier or social preferences for speciﬁc services, all sets of
management actions interior to the frontier represent suboptimal
decisions. These are situations where an EBM approach can lead
to societal beneﬁts at no extra cost, and commonly a gain, for both
services. Such knowledge therefore has the potential to eliminate
some conﬂicts among user groups, as it allows clearly inferior
management decisions to be objectively eliminated. Of particular
interest are situations in which management options that are all
interior to the frontier are being debated. In such cases of ‘‘false
tradeoffs’’, these options may be unnecessarily pitted against each
other, and tradeoff analysis could illustrate that additional man-
agement options exist that simultaneously remove the perceived
tradeoff and produce a win–win outcome.
Second, the relationship between or among services also
indicates whether coordinated management across services is
necessary. In other words, the shape of the frontier can inform
what the optimal management solution(s) is likely to be, narrow-
ing the scope of potential policy options. Examining pairwise
Box 1–Common types of ecosystem service interactions: insights gained from frontier shapes. Although the focus here is on pairs of
services, management decisions will undoubtedly influence multiple services simultaneously. The logic for thinking about the frontier
with multiple services, however, is the same, although it is difficult to visualize more dimensions.
Non-interacting services: These services can be managed independently (e.g., two non-interacting
fisheries species with non overlapping habitat requirements). The optimal management solution is at the
vertex of the two lines. This type of relationship does not typically arise from traditional economic theory.
Direct tradeoff: A management decision that increases the provisioning of one service results in a
proportional decrease of the other service, with no diminishing returns, and vice versa (e.g., zoning
mutually exclusive uses of areas of the ocean). This is a common expectation of how services trade off
with each other, although it is likely uncommon for most ecosystem services.
Convex tradeoff: Obtaining even a small increase in the provisioning of one service comes at a large cost
for the other service. Scenarios near the middle of the frontier are optimal only when societal preferences
for the two services are equal or nearly so. Asymmetrical preferences force management decisions toward
‘‘corner solutions’’ where one of the services is zero (Fig. 1). As a result, stakeholder conflicts are more
likely because there is little middle ground for compromise.
Concave tradeoff: Although there is a tradeoff, there are scenarios that increase the delivery of one service
substantially without a large cost to the other service (e.g., if MPAs produce significant spillover of
targeted fish, they may provide conservation benefits with minimal cost to the fishery). Optimal
management solutions for all types of concave curves occur between the horizontal and vertical tangents
to the curve and corner solutions (where one service is zero) are unlikely because they would reflect an
extreme societal preference for one service over the other. Management is likely to seek a combination of
the two services (Fig. 1).
a Non-monotonic concave tradeoff: There are some levels of one service for which there are two potential
outcomes for the other service. There may be a synergism in the system (e.g., as the yield of a predator
species increases, the yield of its prey can also increase because it is released from natural predation). It is
sub-optimal to make a decision to the left of the peak of the curve, even in cases where the service on the
y-axis is valued infinitely more than the service on the x-axis.
Backwards S tradeoff: Over some range of one service, it can be increased at no cost to the other service.
However, after a threshold it becomes very costly to increase that service in terms of the other. This could
result from the placement of ocean wind farms and a fishery. If the wind turbines exclude fishing or alter
habitat, they could impose costs on the fishery. The costs could initially be small if they are placed in
locations with strong winds and poor fishing grounds. Once these ‘‘low cost’’ sites are filled, however,
obtaining more wind energy will come at great expense to the fishery.service interactions, important rules of thumb and insights
emerge (Box 1). There are likely other variants on these curves,
but this set captures the most common (or at least the most
expected) types of relationships. Furthermore, the societal pre-
ference for one service compared with another, represented by an
indifference curve, will determine which point along the frontier
maximizes social value of ecosystem services [42]. Knowing both
the shape of the frontier and at least some approximation of the
indifference curve allows managers to hone in on a single or small
number of optimal management decisions (Fig. 1). Admittedly,
societal preferences are typically quite difﬁcult to quantify, and
preferences can vary dramatically across segments of society.There are numerous examples in the terrestrial literature of
applying ecosystem service tradeoff analysis to decision-making.
As one example, Nalle et al. [49] examine a three dimensional
tradeoff for timber production and conservation of two wildlife
species using a spatially explicit, dynamic model. They identify
optimal land management decisions, the shortcomings of current
management practices, and the nature of the tradeoff among the
three goals. Polasky et al. [48] examine the tradeoff between
biodiversity conservation (number of species) and economic
return from different types of land use. This spatially explicit
analysis demonstrates the potential for large improvements along
both axes by altering current spatial patterns of land use and that
Fig. 1. Two hypothetical ecosystem service frontier shapes (blue), shown with different possible indifference curves (red). An indifference curve is a representation of
bundles of services for which one has equal preference. Higher indifference curves represent higher levels of total value or utility, but all points on a single curve are
equally preferred. Indifference curves are down-sloping and typically convex, because the per-unit value of goods or services generally increases as that good or service
becomes scarcer. The highest indifference curve that touches the frontier (star) represents the optimal delivery given the preferences captured by the indifference curves.
In the case of a concave frontier, knowing the indifference curve has relatively little impact on the optimal management solution; both panels A and B result in a
combination of both services. In contrast, for the case of a convex frontier, most indifference curves result in one service being maximized at the extreme expense of the
other service (panels C and D), and therefore it is more informative in this case to have a good estimate of the indifference curve. (For interpretation of the references to
color in this ﬁgure caption, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)optimal land management options fall along a concave frontier. As
another example, Wossink and Swinton [50] examine tradeoffs
between agriculture production and the provision of non-market
services such as pollination. They theoretically explore the potential
for non-monotonic concave frontiers, whereby, for example, crop
output and pollination service can have a complimentary or
competitive relationship over different levels of pollination output.
Production theory can also be used to examine service trade-
offs without employing graphical analysis. For example, Naidoo
and Ricketts [51] conduct a cost-beneﬁt analysis for forest
conservation in Paraguay, examining the beneﬁts in terms of ﬁve
ecosystem services, relative to opportunity costs. Their approach
compared maps of different spatial planning decisions, informing
what spatial conﬁgurations of conservation measures yielded the
highest beneﬁts relative to costs. All of these examples illustrate
how tradeoff analysis can be applied to natural resource manage-
ment, but these in-depth case studies lack a more general
framework. Box 1 is intended to provide a synthesis of ecosystem
service tradeoff theory that will enable more widespread adop-
tion of the approach.
3. Ecosystem service tradeoff analysis for the oceans
As demonstrated thus far, the fundamental economic theory
behind tradeoff analysis is well developed and applicable to anyecosystem type. However, marine systems offer a particularly
challenging prospect for examining tradeoffs among services.
Oceans are facing an ever increasing number of human uses and
threats, while also typically plagued by fragmented governance.
However, MSP offers a promising opportunity for more integrated
and ecosystem-based management of multiple services, provided
there are the scientiﬁc approaches to support such integrated
decision making. Two hypothetical case studies grounded in data
are presented here, suggesting how tradeoff analysis can advance
marine resource management. These examples are intended to
catalyze future applications of tradeoff analysis within MSP
processes.
3.1. Case study: ﬁshery yield and biomass preservation
Fisheries over-exploitation is widely regarded as the primary
cause of recently publicized ﬁsheries collapses [23,52]. One
suggested approach for conserving ﬁsh stocks and marine biodi-
versity is to create marine protected areas in which all ﬁshing is
prohibited, also known as no-take marine reserves [53–56].
Indeed, marine protected areas are typically one of the spatial
designations identiﬁed in MSP and ocean zoning plans [57,58].
Although marine reserves eliminate ﬁshing within their bound-
aries, ﬁsheries management outside the reserves can have sig-
niﬁcant effects on the performance of the reserve, and on the
ultimate system-wide biomass. For example, for species with
considerable adult movement or larval dispersal, small (or spar-
sely located) marine reserves may not protect stocks if ﬁshing
pressure is sufﬁciently high outside [59,60]. Furthermore,
although it is intuitive that ﬁshery closures reduce proﬁt from
ﬁshing, a less intuitive but powerful recent ﬁnding is that ﬁsh-
eries proﬁts can be maintained or even enhanced, for some
species, by the tactical siting of marine reserve networks that
take advantage of adult spillover and larval export [61–65]. Thus,
the size, proximity, and locations of marine reserves will interact
in complex ways with ﬁsh growth, production, and dispersal, as
well as with spatially distinct ﬁsheries exploitation, to inﬂuence
two common management objectives: ﬁsh conservation and
proﬁtable ﬁsheries.
To evaluate the tradeoff between biomass conservation (ﬁsh
biomass remaining in the sea) and sustainable ﬁshery proﬁt, a
spatially heterogeneous model of ﬁsh production, dispersal,
harvest, and proﬁts is used, building on Costello and Polasky
[62]. This model is illustrative, and is not intended to replicate
any particular geographic region. However, to maintain some
level of realism, it is loosely parameterized based on data from
the central coast region of California. The model contains a set of
48 distinct patches, each with its own adult survival, larval
production, and dispersal to other patches. Spatial heterogeneity
enters in two ways. First, larval dispersal depends on ocean
currents [66], which are non-uniform in the study system.
Second, patch-level adult survival depends on local habitat. In
this case, the model focuses on a species associated with kelp, e.g.,
kelp bass. In the model, higher kelp density in a patch leads to
higher adult survival, and density dependence entered through a
Beverton–Holt stock recruitment relationship [67]. The full suite
of model parameters for each of the 48 patches is available from
the authors upon request.
Spatial harvest interacts with abundance (assuming intraco-
hort density-dependence) to affect ﬁsh production. Thus, any
given spatial harvest strategy (e.g., constant patch-level harvest;1 1.5 2 2.5
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Fig. 2. Tradeoffs between system-wide biomass (horizontal axis) and system-wide
management is composed of patch-speciﬁc harvest levels, including the possibility of
frontier (where every patch can have an optimal patch-speciﬁc ﬁshing pressure) and
randomly designed marine reserve networks (with optimal patch-speciﬁc harvest levels
in marine reserves indicated by the color and size of the circle. The pure proﬁt maximizi
scenarios in which all patches have the same ﬁshing mortality rate, ranging from zeroheterogeneous harvest across space to maximize steady state
proﬁt; set harvest to 0 in some subset of patches to effectively
designate these patches as marine reserves) gives rise to an
equilibrium ﬁsh abundance (in each of N patches), and an
equilibrium ﬁshery proﬁt. System-wide ﬁshery proﬁt is the sum
of patch-level proﬁt. Proﬁt in a patch is price (scaled to 1)
multiplied by harvest minus harvest cost, where harvest cost
includes a small ‘‘stock effect’’, as in White et al. [61]. Data on kelp
abundance, bottom type, and dispersal characteristics, obtained
from the Marine Life Protection Act Initiative (http://www.mar
inemap.org/mlpa/), are overlaid on the model domain. The larval
dispersal matrix is derived from a Regional Ocean Modeling
System [68] oceanographic circulation model [69], assuming a
pelagic larval duration of 26–36 days; larvae that reach patches
with suitable habitat at the conclusion of the larval period recruit
into the adult population. Adults are assumed to have a sufﬁ-
ciently small home range to be considered sessile.
The model is ﬁrst run simulating 300 harvest policies. Each
simulated policy is generated by randomly designing a marine
reserve network among the 48 patches (i.e., by closing different
sets of patches to ﬁshing) and optimizing exploitation of the
ﬁshery in each patch outside of the reserve network. The objective
to be maximized (by choosing spatial harvest in each patch
outside the reserve) is the weighted sum of ﬁshery proﬁt and
biomass, in steady state. The simulated harvest policies rando-
mize the weights within this objective. Equilibrium proﬁt is
plotted against equilibrium ﬁsh biomass remaining in the sea,
with any given harvest strategy representing a point on the
tradeoff graph (Fig. 2). All points are scaled relative to the
maximum proﬁt and maximum biomass, so the theoretical
maximum joint production is (1,1). Second, the frontier is calcu-
lated by optimizing the weighted objective speciﬁed above, but
by leaving the marine reserve network unconstrained (i.e., opti-
mizing ﬁshing pressure in every single patch). The weights in the
objective function are altered to trace out the frontier. Lastly, a
simulation was run in which ﬁshing pressure is constant across all3 3.5 4 4.5 5
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proﬁt (vertical axis) for a harvested, spatially explicit meta-population. Fishery
marine reserves in some patches. The solid line indicates the ecosystem service
circles interior to the frontier represent (biomass, proﬁt) combinations from 300
in all patches outside of the closed patches), with the percent of the area set aside
ng solution involves 34% closure and is shown by the asterisk (*). Squares represent
(square furthest to the right) to 0.25 (square furthest to the left).
patches, ranging from 0 in all patches (100% no-take areas) to a
ﬁshing mortality rate of 0.25 in all patches.
In this example, the frontier is concave, indicating that it is
possible to increase the delivery of one service substantially without
a large cost for the other service, and that corner solutions (where one
service is zero) would only be chosen if there exists extreme societal
preference for one service over the other (Fig. 2). Instead, manage-
ment is likely to seek a combination of conservation and ﬁshery
proﬁts. The potential role of marine reserves in obtaining this
combination of services can be explored by examining the percentage
of the study area set aside in reserves (if any) for management actions
that lie along the efﬁciency frontier. In this example, all harvest
policies along the efﬁciency frontier include at least some patches
with zero ﬁshing pressure (marine reserves), with many including a
signiﬁcant percent of the area set aside as no-take areas. This suggests
that protected areas not only contribute to conservation but are
also an important component of an economically proﬁtable manage-
ment scenario. Even the policy that maximizes proﬁt without
explicit regard for system biomass (‘‘*’’ in Fig. 2) contains 34% of the
area in marine reserves. Furthermore, when reserves are prohibited
by forcing all patches to have the same ﬁshing pressure (Fig. 2,
squares), proﬁts are always lower (by as much as 44%) compared to
the scenario in which reserves are allowed and ﬁshing pressure is
patchy across space. This is consistent with a more sophisticated
modeling study examining the value of spatially optimized manage-
ment [70]. These results, if they hold more generally, have the
potential to help minimize disputes between conservation and ﬁsh-
eries interests and highlight marine reserves as a key component of
marine spatial plans.
3.2. Case study: wave energy, ﬁshery yield and real estate value
Rising fuel costs and concerns about the negative impacts of
climate change have led to an increased interest in renewable,
zero-emissions energy sources (e.g. [71,72]). As a result, wind,
wave and tidal power harnessed from coastal areas are being
widely considered and implemented around the world. However,
in many cases there is not an adequate understanding of the
ecological and environmental consequences of these new tech-
nologies, or how they may interact – positively or negatively –
with other services [73–75]. This is true of wave energy, which is
being actively considered for many coastal regions [76], including
the Oregon coast in the US and Spain and Portugal in the EU
[77,78]. As an emerging service, wave energy offers the opportu-
nity to apply the ecosystem service tradeoff analysis proactively,
using it as a tool to inform the spatial siting of wave energy
facilities in a manner that minimizes conﬂicts among multiple
ocean uses.
In this case example, siting of wave energy conversion arrays is
examined, considering tradeoffs between wave energy production
and ﬁshery proﬁts and the value of the coastal viewshed. This
analysis approximates wave energy siting for the coast of Oregon,
and focuses on siting in the offshore dimension. While in reality,
placement decisions will need to be made in a two-dimensional
context, this cross-shore analysis provides a ﬁrst approximation
of some of the key service interactions. Speciﬁcally, wave energy
devices are best anchored over sandy bottoms, which is also
prime habitat and ﬁshing grounds for Dungeness crab. Addition-
ally, real estate value of coastal properties may be affected by the
visual impact of wave energy devices. A simple model is used to
examine the interactions among wave energy production, crab
ﬁshery proﬁt, and impact to coastal real estate value from the
altered viewscape, with respect to the offshore placement of a
wave buoy array.
Design studies based on a single wave energy conversion
(WEC) device generating 190 kW were used, suggesting that atarget commercial wave power farm of 34 MWwould require 180
WEC devices arranged in an array extending 2 km cross-shelf and
9 km alongshore [79]. This amounts to about 4 MW/km of coast-
line. The 34-MW wave power array generates 300,000 MW h per
year. If wave energy can be produced and sold at a proﬁt of $0.01/
kW h, this would amount to $3  106 per year per array. Dividing
by the alongshore length of the array yields about $3  105 per
year per alongshore km. Wave energy conversion devices are not
safe to deploy too close to shore where large winter waves could
damage the devices and potentially uproot the array. Therefore,
the assumption is made that WEC devices would not be placed
shallower than the 30-m isobath (3 km offshore for a 1% bottom
slope). The expense of larger mooring elements and longer
electrical transmission lines diminishes the proﬁtability of wave
power generation as water depth increases offshore. Thus, it is
assumed the highest proﬁtability occurs in a water depth of 50 m
[80], which for the typical inner-shelf bottom slope off Oregon of
1%, is found 5 km offshore. Proﬁtability declines shoreward of this
location, dropping to zero at 3 km and also declines toward the
deep sea, dropping to zero at 10 km offshore (Fig. 3B and Table 1).
The annual revenue from the Oregon Dungeness crab ﬁshery
over the past decade ranges from $5 million to $44 million per
year, based on ﬂuctuations in harvest levels and market condi-
tions (http://www.oregondungeness.org/ﬁshery.shtml). Using the
high value and dividing by the length of the Oregon coastline,
about 440 km (admittedly an overestimate since about 10% of the
Oregon shelf is rocky bottom, which is not exploited by the crab
ﬁshery), this is $1  105 per alongshore kilometer of coastline per
year. The high value of the crab ﬁshery was used to represent
potential value of the ﬁshery. While not needed for the tradeoff
analysis, one can estimate the number of crab pots needed to
realize this catch value. Using an estimate of $1.43 per crab, this
amounts to 7.0  104 crabs per km per year. If it is assumed that
during the four-month intensive crab ﬁshing season, pots are
turned around every 6 days and about 10 crabs are caught in each
pot per soak, then the total crab catch would require about 350
pots per kilometer (i.e., 154,000 pots ﬁshed in Oregon waters),
which is not an unrealistic number (http://www.oregondunge
ness.org/ﬁshery.shtml). In order to estimate the impact of displa-
cing the crab ﬁshery for a WEC array, it is necessary to know the
cross-shelf distribution of pots. It is assumed that pots are placed
no closer than the 30-m isobath (3 km offshore) (an under-
estimate of how close to shore crabs are ﬁshed) and no deeper
than the 90-m isobath (9 km offshore) and that the optimum crab
ﬁshing depth is at the 60-m isobath (6 km offshore) (Table 1)
(http://www.oregondungeness.org/ﬁshery.shtml). To estimate
the impact on the crab ﬁshery due to the presence of a wave
energy installation, the loss of a 2-km cross-shelf swath – the
width of the WEC array – is moved across the crab ﬁshery proﬁt
curve from zero to 15 km offshore, resulting in the curve in
Fig. 3A.
To model the effect of a wave farm on coastal real estate values
via its alteration of the viewscape, it is assumed that a wave buoy
is approximately 6 m in height and 4.5 m in width (e.g., Finavera
Renewables, AquaBuOY) and the height of an observer is 5 m
(height from a typical bluff). The wave buoy array is modeled as
9 km long perpendicular to the coast, with wave buoys evenly
distributed across the 9 km  2 km array. In Oregon, the median
value of a 1-acre cross-shore, 1-km along-shore parcel of coastal
property (ca. 15 acres along the coast), with a median distribution
of one residence structure per acre, is $21,000,000 (using http://
www.rwre.com, the median was calculated based on 33 coastal
properties with ocean views that listed the asking price and
acreage, November 2008). To make this property value compar-
able to the ﬁshery and energy annualized values, the property
value (with an intact view) was multiplied by a discount rate of
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Fig. 3. The value, in dollars per year per km of coastline, of wave energy (B) and the values of the crab ﬁshery (A) and coastal property (C) as modiﬁed by the placement of a
wave energy facility, with respect to the offshore placement of a wave energy facility.
Table 1
Functions used to model the three services in the wave energy case study.
Service Functions
Wave energy proﬁt (WE) WE ¼ 0 for x o 3 km,
WE ¼ $3  105 sin[p(x  3 km)/4 km]
for x Z 3 km and x o 5 km,
WE ¼$ 3  105 cos[p(x  5 km)/10 km]
for x Z 3 km and x o 5 km,
WE ¼ 0 for x Z 10 km
Crab ﬁshery proﬁt (CF) CF ¼ 0 for x o 3 km,
CF ¼ $ sin[p(x  3 km)/6 km]
for x Z 3 and x o 9,
CF ¼ 0 for x Z 9 km
Viewscape value (VS) VS ¼ $2.1  107  d; d ¼ discousnt
rate ¼ 0.055% to get the future value of the view in $/km through inﬁnite
time (Table 1). Finally, given that there is somewhat equivocal
evidence regarding the effect of offshore wind or wave farms on
aesthetics and property values [81–83], it was assumed that
annualized property values were decreased by the proportion of
the horizon view that is impacted. This proportion is calculated
using simple geometry, based on the height of the observer, the
height and width of the energy facility, and the distance of the
facility offshore (from zero to 15 km offshore), taking into account
the curvature of the earth and assuming that coastal properties
have a 90 degree angle view of the ocean. Property values are
reduced by 2% or less (Fig. 3C).
The analysis reduces to a cost-beneﬁt analysis because all
three services are modeled in the same units ($/km/year); the
values of the three services are summed to determine the optimal
offshore placement for a WEC array, where total value is max-
imized (Fig. 4A). In cases where services are not valued in
common units, the frontier can be determined from multi-
dimensional tradeoff analysis. In this example, the frontier is
complex with multiple inﬂection points (Fig. 4B). Considering all
three services, the optimal placement of a wave energy facility is
at 4.95 km offshore. This is only slightly inshore from where it
would be sited without considering the other services (5 km). This
can also be compared with the optimal siting considering wave
energy and the crab ﬁshery only (4.93 km) or wave energy and
property value only (5.12 km). The value distribution of the crabﬁshery pushes the optimal placement of a wave facility closer to
shore, while property value has the opposite effect.
Considering all three services, wave facility placement is
minimally affected by the two other services because of the large
dollar value of energy production relative to the other services
and because of the opposing spatial effects of interactions with
the other services. In some cases, as is shown here, tradeoff
analysis may indicate that interactions that were presumed to be
important are relatively insigniﬁcant, potentially ameliorating
stakeholder conﬂicts. On the other hand, if other services had
been examined or if these services had been valued in terms other
than dollars, a different answer may have emerged.4. Conclusions
This paper presents a straightforward, scientiﬁcally based
approach for quantitatively evaluating tradeoffs among multiple
ecosystem services. Acknowledgment of such tradeoffs is not
new—managers and ecologists have long recognized the complex
interactions between different human uses of ecosystems. How-
ever, there is a tendency for decisions about tradeoffs to be made
implicitly, which is often exacerbated by fragmented or single-
sector management, whereby each service is managed indepen-
dently. An ecosystem service tradeoff approach reveals when the
single-sector approach is appropriate and when there is a need for
a more integrated, ecosystem-based approach. It also reveals
suboptimal management decisions, with the potential for elim-
inating conﬂicts among user groups when a service or multiple
services could be maintained or even increased without a cost to
other services. Finally, this framework can also be used to
evaluate when the frontier is unobtainable due to regulatory or
legal constraints and could even be used to guide institutional
changes to ensure more equitable service delivery.
While the simplicity of the approach as presented here makes
it an ideal starting point for evaluating tradeoffs among ecosys-
tem services, implementing the approach in practice is not with-
out challenges. It is difﬁcult to accurately estimate indifference
curves (and in particular, deﬁne what is meant by ‘‘societal
preference’’), develop production functions, and identify appro-
priate ecosystem service metrics [84] given the diversity of
human values, perceptions and preferences related to ocean uses
Fig. 4. The combined value of wave energy, crab ﬁshery proﬁt, and coastal property with respect to the offshore placement of a wave energy facility (A) and the tradeoff
curve for this three service interaction (B). Each point on the graph refers to an offshore placement distance(s) of the wave energy facility and the star represents the
optimal solution, where the tradeoff curve has a slope of 1 (all services tradeoff equally in marginal value) and the maximum total value is achieved when the wave farm
is sited 4.95 km from shore.and the contention surrounding the valuation of non-market
goods. Furthermore, it may often be difﬁcult to identify and
quantify all of the services and issues that should guide deci-
sion-making. These challenges are not entirely insurmountable,
and added complexity will certainly be required to improve the
applicability of this tool to real world management. For example,
production functions and service interactions are not static over
time. To consider temporal variability, efﬁciency frontiers can be
assumed to have a dynamic path, rather than operating in steady
state (e.g. [49]), with management decisions taking frontier
trajectories into account. Additionally, our ability to distinguish
among different types of service interactions depends on our level
of certainty regarding how much of the services will be realized
under different management policies. If uncertainty is high and
the error bars around each point are large, it may be difﬁcult to
distinguish among frontier shapes. However, alternative frontiers
can be analyzed in order to consider uncertainty from inputs,
from external drivers, and for the effect of management actions.
Historical data and past management ‘‘experiments’’ and asso-
ciated outcomes can be used to learn more about the system.
Ironically, management failures of the past may even prove
beneﬁcial in the long-term because of their contribution to
reducing uncertainty.
The framework presented here has the potential to advance
how marine spatial planning is conducted. Managers and scien-
tists need simple and transparent means for determining the
tradeoffs, or lack thereof, among key services and communicating
these interactions to policy makers and stakeholders. This
approach can be readily communicated, developed using complex
simulation models, empirical data, or a conceptual understanding
of the system, applied in a range of systems and to a variety of
services and service metrics, and can be nested within other
marine management approaches (e.g., Integrated Ecosystem
Assessments [85]). Tradeoff analysis can also evaluate services
that are not readily valued in monetary units, and can considerservices measured in different units, allowing managers a quan-
titative approach for balancing services that otherwise would
seem like apples and oranges. These attributes suggest that
ecosystem service tradeoff analysis is likely to be a key ingredient
in efforts to realize effective marine spatial planning in which
existing and emerging ocean uses are explicitly planned for in a
spatial context.Acknowledgments
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